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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the economic performance of three Latin American coun-
tries (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) from a comparative perspective, using as a
benchmark a group of four developed countries (France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and the United States). The focus is on the relative performance within
the region and between the Latin American countries and the developed countries
in the period 1900-1980. The paper argues that Argentina and Uruguay benefited
from a privileged position in international markets at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury and this allowed them to converge. However, they failed to adjust to the major
long-run change in the pattern of world trade brought about by World War I and
the Great Depression, which implied a persistent decline of their export markets.
On the other hand, Brazil, after having been much less successful until 1930, grew
at higher rates thereafter based on rapid structural change and the building up of
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competitive advantages in new industrial sectors. The more vigorous Brazilian
policy for industrialization and export diversification may explain why Brazil suc-
ceeded in changing its pattern of specialization, while Argentina and Uruguay
were locked in to the old pattern. A typology of convergence regimes is sugges-
ted based on the growth experience of these countries.
Keywords: Convergence regimes; Balance-of-Payments-constrained growth;
path-dependency; Argentina, Brazil Uruguay
JEL Classification: N16 (Economic History-Macroeconomics and Monetary
Economics; Growth and Fluctuations-Latin America)
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the economic performance of three Latin American
countries, namely Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, from a comparative perspecti-
ve. The comparison uses a group of four developed countries as a benchmark:
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States (G-4). The focus of
the paper is on convergence and divergence in terms of GDP per capita between
the three Latin American countries and the group of advanced countries between
1900 and 1980. Convergence (divergence) is defined as the process by which the
difference in GDP per capita of the Latin American countries and the average
GDP per capita of the reference countries falls (increases) through time. In addi-
tion, the paper discusses why Brazil was able to attain a more favorable growth
performance than Argentina and Uruguay. It is argued that different patterns of
international trade and differences in industrial policy after World War II help to
explain why Brazil was a case of moderate success in catching-up with the deve-
loped countries until 1980, while Argentina and Uruguay clearly lagged behind.
France, Germany, the UK and the USA are taken as a benchmark for the con-
vergence analysis. The literature suggests that convergence arises from combining
the development of domestic, scientific and technological capabilities, the lear-
ning activities derived from the pattern of trade specialization, and the technolo-
gical spillovers induced by international trade and capital flows (Fagerberg, 1994;
Verspagen, 1993). The four countries mentioned represented high shares of the
three Latin American countries’ exports and imports and they were also the main
destination and origin of capital flows. They represented the frontier, the develo-
ped economies towards which the region struggled to approach during the last
century.
The period considered in this study goes from 1900 to 1980. It thus embraces
the last decades of the classical liberal era, its collapse following the Great
Depression, and the heydays and subsequent collapse of the Bretton Woods
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system. The paper does not consider the last quarter of the 20th century, in which
the pattern of technical change shifted significantly. From a Latin American pers-
pective, the work concludes with the end of the process of import-substituting
industrialization. In effect, the 1980s represented a moment of profound disconti-
nuity in Latin America’s growth trend. The pattern of growth changed substan-
tially thereafter, due to the debt crisis and to the implementation of free-market
economic reforms in the 1990s. These critical new dimensions of economic
growth in the region justify the decision not to continue the study beyond the
beginning of the debt crisis.
The paper argues that the asymmetric performance of Brazil compared with its
neighbors in Southern Latin America during this period can be explained by com-
bining the balance-of-payments-constrained growth theory (Thirlwall, 1979;
Cimoli, 1988; McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994, chapter 5) and the theory of path-
dependency and lock-in in specialization, as proposed by David (1985) and Arthur
(1994). In a nutshell, for a country to converge it has to be competitive in sectors
of high demand growth in the international economy. Argentina and Uruguay
benefited from a privileged position in international markets at the beginning of
the 20th century. However, they failed to adjust to the major long run change in the
pattern of world trade (negative demand shock) beginning with World War I and
the Great Depression which implied a persistent decline of their export markets.
On the other hand, Brazil, after having been much less successful until 1930, grew
at higher rates thereafter based on rapid structural change and the building up of
competitive advantages in new industrial sectors. The more vigorous Brazilian
policy for industrialization and export diversification could explain why Brazil
succeeded in changing its pattern of specialization, while Argentina and Uruguay
remained locked-in to the old pattern.
A caveat is necessary at this point. Brazil can hardly be considered a case of
undisputed success in the international economy. After fifty years of convergence,
it was still behind Argentina in terms of real GDP per capita. Moreover, Brazil
was a relative failure when compared with the South East Asian economies which
converged with the developed economies at a very high rate after World War II
(Palma, 1996). On the other hand, Brazil did represent a case of convergence
(even if this process was slow and began from a very low initial GDP per capita
level), while Argentina and Uruguay diverged most of the time with respect to the
G-4. Thus, although Brazil will be considered in this paper as a case of relative
success at a regional level, this by no means implies that its growth path was opti-
mal or desirable.
This paper is divided into seven sections including the introduction and the
concluding remarks. Section 2 offers a brief theoretical review of the Balance-of-
Payments-constrained growth model (BPC) and path-dependency, relating this
literature with the Schumpeterian (technology-driven) approach to international
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competitiveness. Section 3 presents some stylised facts, focusing on phases of
convergence and divergence between the Latin American countries and the group
of four advanced economies (G-4). Section 4 tests the BPC growth model and dis-
cusses how external shocks and structural change after the Great Depression and
World War II affected the rate of growth compatible with external equilibrium in
Latin America. Section 5 addresses the changes suffered in the international con-
text in the 1930s and discusses why this had a particularly negative impact on
Argentina and Uruguay. Section 6 focuses on industrial policy as an explanation
of why structural change in the post Second World War period was slower in
Argentina and Uruguay than in Brazil. A preliminary typology of convergence and
divergence regimes is proposed in the concluding remarks.
2. BALANCE-OF-PAYMENT-CONSTRAINED GROWTH,
SPECIALIZATION AND PATH-DEPENDENCY
This work takes as its point of departure the theory of balance-of-payments-
constrained (BPC) growth (Thirlwall, 1979; Cimoli, 1988; McCombie and
Thirlwall, 1994), formally stated as follows:
where X is the volume of exports, M is the volume of imports, P is the domestic
price level, P* is the international price level, E is the nominal exchange rate
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(units of local currency per dollar), Z is real world income, Y is real domestic inco-
me, F represents real net capital inflows, Ø and v are (negative) price elasticities,
ε and π are (positive) income elasticities and a  PX / (PX  PF) is the participa-
tion of exports in total foreign exchange earnings (denominated in domestic
currency units). Equations [1] and [2] are constant-elasticity equations of demand
for exports and imports respectively. Equation [3] gives the condition for equili-
brium in the balance of payments. Lower case letters represent the rate of growth
of the variables is the rate of growth of the quantity of exports, p
is domestic inflation and p* is foreign inflation). Equations [4] to [6] are obtained
through logarithmic differentiation with respect to time of equations [1] to [3]. y*
is the rate of growth which keeps the balance of payments in equilibrium, defined
by equation [7] which is obtained by substituting [5] and [6] in [4].
Lack of data for capital flows for the period prior to the 1950s makes it extre-
mely difficult to include this variable in the analysis in an appropriate way.
Provisional evidence (unfortunately limited for so long to the Uruguayan case)
suggests, however, that it is reasonable to assume that capital inflows and outflows
cancel each other out in the long run. Capital flows fluctuated significantly in the
Latin American countries. Although the external constraint on growth may be
temporarily alleviated by capital inflows, this positive influence would be rever-
sed in subsequent periods by a corresponding outflow of foreign exchange with a
view to servicing the debt and due to capital exports in search of more profitable
and reliable markets. Therefore, in the long run, a may be assumed to be equal to
unity in equations [4] and [7]. In other words, the cyclical movements in capital
flows, following the well documented long swings prevailing in the region in the
period 1870-2000 (Bértola & Lorenzo, 2003), are excluded from the analysis,
implying that the focus lies in current account equilibrium rather than in balance
of payments equilibrium.
If the principle of purchasing power parity (PPP) holds in the long run, the real
exchange rate will remain stable and therefore (p-p*e)  0. Although there is no
consensus on this point, most empirical studies suggest that the PPP hypothesis
does work well in empirical tests (Rogoff, 1996). However, the evidence also sug-
gests that terms of trade may remain off-equilibrium for about six to ten years
(Cashin and Mac Dermott, 2003). For this reason, in this paper empirical exerci-
ses will include the terms of trade in the calculation of the demand functions. This
should avoid the risk of using biased estimates of the parameters of the model due
to misspecification problems (omitted variables) in the demand function.
Although the concern of this paper is mainly centered on long-run trends, the
existence of Kuznets-type swings is not ignored. They are, generally speaking,
determined by restrictions related to current account equilibrium, but are also sha-
ped by movements in capital flows and terms of trade, as well as by policy deci-
x
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1 A classical reference in this respect is Pasinetti (1984). See also Saviotti, and Pyka (2004).
sions affecting the exchange rate. All these factors influence the growth rate of the
economy, produce differences in the relative response of tradables and non-trada-
bles and indirectly affect the income elasticity of demand for exports and imports
themselves.
Back to the long-run, assuming a  1 then:
In addition, assuming PPP, equation [8] gives:
Equation [8] amounts to a simplified model of international GDP convergen-
ce, where 1/π represents a dynamic version of the foreign trade multiplier origi-
nally set forth by Harrod (1933). The ε/π ratio is the country’s non-price compe-
titiveness, which depends on its economic structure, the pattern of specialization
and the development of technological capabilities (McCombie and Thirlwall,
chapter 4). y* is the rate of growth compatible with current account equilibrium.
If non-price competitiveness is higher than unity [i.e. (ε/π) > 1], then? y* > z and
the GDP of the less developed country will converge towards that of the advanced
country.
How is non-price competitiveness determined? In the very long run, income
elasticity parameters are not constant but evolve with demand and supply forces.
On the demand side, the institutional framework in which international markets
work may change, as may consumer preferences. On the supply side, capital accu-
mulation and technological learning reshape competitive advantages. Therefore, it
is necessary to combine Keynesian demand-led growth with Schumpeterian struc-
tural change to explain economic growth (Abramovitz, 1986; Dosi and Fabiani,
1994). The latter will depend on the ability of each country to promote structural
change in such a way that the pattern of specialization evolves towards sectors that
exhibit high rates of demand growth in the international markets as well as high
rates of productivity growth. The effort required for technological learning and
catching up is a key variable behind why some countries succeed while others fail
to promote structural change (Neslon and Phelps, 1966; Fagerberg, 1994). There
is an increasingly large amount of literature pointing out the key role of the diver-
sification of the productive structure (structural change) in fostering growth in the
long run 1.
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2 This can be considered a stylised fact in the empirical literature on patterns of trade (Dalum
et al., 1998).
In addition, the literature on increasing returns and path-dependency suggests
that specialization tends to show considerable inertia 2 (Arthur, 1994, chapter 1;
David, 1988). Positive feed-backs may give rise to lock-in effects: when a major
shift in demand or technology occurs, entering new dynamic sectors is a slow,
painstaking process. In particular, technological learning is highly localized and
cumulative which means that barriers to entry increase when firms move towards
sectors not closely related to their core field of expertise (Cimoli and Dosi, 1995).
Moreover, externalities related to technological complementarities between indus-
tries may produce multiple equilibria and slow-growth traps. In this case, institu-
tions could play a key role in guiding the economy towards a high growth-rate
equilibrium (Durlauff, 1992; Dosi and Orsenigo, 1987).
To sum up, changing the pattern of specialization is a difficult process in
which institutional change and policy innovation play crucial roles. Otherwise,
cumulative forces may lead to a process of growing divergence in which techno-
logical capabilities and market shares shrink through time. This paper argues that
the failure to encourage structural change in Argentina and Uruguay was a criti-
cal dimension of the reason why these two countries fell behind after World War
I, while Brazil was more successful in this respect.
3. STYLISED FACTS
Convergence is defined in terms of reducing differences in the real GDP per
capita between the laggard country and the advanced country. Convergence and
divergence between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (ABU) and the average real
per capita GDP of four selected developed countries used as a benchmark
(France, Germany, UK and USA, the G-4) is shown in Figure 1.
Since the mid-1910s, Argentina and Uruguay diverged from the G-4.
Considering the whole 1900-1980 period, they diverged at a similar rate, of about
—0.8% per annum. On the contrary, Brazil converged at an annual rate of 0.9%.
Brazilian convergence was significant but nevertheless unable to compensate for
the difference in real GDP per capita which existed in the region at the beginning
of the 20th century. The Brazilian relative real per capita GDP with respect to
Argentina increased from about 20% in 1900 to 60% in 1980. This gap would
almost disappear by the end of the century.
The dynamics of convergence and divergence were far from uniform and sig-
nificantly different sub-periods can be identified representing different conver-
gence and divergence regimes. Between 1900 and 1914, Argentina and Uruguay
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were improving their relative position with respect to the G-4 while Brazil remai-
ned unchanged, implying that Argentina and Uruguay increased their real GDP
per capita advantage with respect to Brazil. However, after World War I the rela-
tive positions of Argentina and Uruguay started to worsen and this became a ste-
ady process of divergence following the Great Depression. At exactly the same
time, Brazil began its process of convergence with the G-4 and as a consequence
(at a more rapid pace) with its neighbours.
After the 1930s Brazil converged most of the time with the G-4. Although
some temporary setbacks took place during the war and in the early 1960s, these
were followed by periods of vigorous recovery. On the other hand, each external
shock seems to have reduced the ability of Argentina and Uruguay to grow for
longer periods. The divergence process was especially intense after World War II,
although it receded for a few years in the 1960s in Argentina and in the 1940s and
1970s in Uruguay.
The process of divergence can also be seen when the USA real GDP per capi-
ta is used as a benchmark instead of the G-4 (see Figure 2).
Argentina and Uruguay both fell to much lower levels of GDP per capita with
respect to the USA after World War I and World War II and continued to fall
behind this country for the rest of the period. As has already been seen in the case
GRAPHIC 1
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE: ARGENTINA, BRAZIL
AND URUGUAY, 1900-1980
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Pe
r C
ap
ita
 F
DP
 
(G
4 =
10
0)
Year
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
G4
190
0
190
3
190
6
190
9
191
2
191
5
191
8
192
1
192
4
192
7
193
0
193
3
193
6
193
9
194
2
194
5
194
8
195
1
195
4
195
7
196
0
196
3
196
6
196
9
197
2
197
5
197
8
CONVERGENCE, TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND URUGUAY...
9
of the G-4, a clear convergent trend prevailed in Brazil, although during some
short periods of time this country also diverged from the USA.
World War I and especially the Great Depression and World War II were tur-
ning points for Argentina and Uruguay, not only in terms of per capita GDP
levels, but also in terms of subsequent rates of economic growth. On the other
hand, Brazil suffered these shocks but reacted in such a way that it managed to
maintain its higher rates of growth afterwards. In the next section, the performan-
ce of the three countries in the international economy will be addressed from the
perspective of the evolution of the capacity to take advantage of the opportunities
offered by international trade.
4. CONVERGENCE AND NON-PRICE COMPETITIVENESS
As mentioned above, balance-of-payments-constrained growth models sug-
gest that in the long run it is the ratio of the income elasticity of the demand for
exports and imports (what McCombie and Thirlwall, 1994 call non-price compe-
titiveness) which defines the rate of growth consistent with external equilibrium.
GRAPHIC 2
REAL PER CAPITA GDP CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE
WITH THE UNITED STATES
Sources: Heston et al. (2005) and Maddison (1991). See also Bértola & Porcile (2000), Statistical
Appendix.
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Argentina and Uruguay suffered a major negative long run demand shock as a
result of World War I and the Great Depression which drastically reduced the
income elasticity of the demand for exports and, as a consequence, their long run
equilibrium growth rate. Brazil also suffered this shock but the impact was less
damaging than in Argentina and Uruguay. In contrast, after World War II, Brazil
was more successful than Argentina and Uruguay in promoting structural change.
This reshaped (to a larger extent in Brazil) the production and export structures in
favor of manufactured goods which were technologically more dynamic and
represented an increasing share of international trade. This section addresses the
impact of changes in the international economy and of structural change on
growth in the three Latin American countries.
With this objective, equation [8] was estimated including two dummy varia-
bles: D1 equals zero for the years before 1930 and unity otherwise, while D2
adopts the value zero for the years before 1939 and 1 otherwise. Therefore, the
dummies capture the transformation in the pattern of growth related to two key
events in the international economy —the years after the collapse of the classi-
cal liberal era in 1930 and the workings of the Bretton Woods regime after World
War II.
Before running the regression based on equation [8], the degree of integration
of the variables was tested. It is observed that all variables are I(1), i.e. variables
in levels have a unit root and are stationary in first differences (Table 1). Since this
is a dynamic model in which the variables are expressed in terms of rates of
growth, then all the variables included in the model are stationary. The estimation
of the parameters of equation [8] —the income elasticity ratio (ε/π) or non-price
competitiveness, and the price elasticities (Ø and )— is calculated using GLS in
a panel data approach in which the effects of external shocks are specific to each
country but in which the coefficients of the independent variables are assumed to
be the same for all countries.
From table 2 it can be concluded that:
i) Growth in the international economy has a significant positive effect on
the rate of economic growth in the Latin American countries. According to the
BPC-growth theory, this effect is related to non-price competitiveness (ε/π in
equation [8]) which in turn reflects the patterns of production and trade in the
Latin American countries.
ii) The influence of the terms of trade is not significant. This result is, in
general, compatible with the literature (see McCombie, 1997) and supports the
simpler version of the balance-of-payments-constrained growth model, as expres-
sed in equation [8’].
iii) The dummy variables which seek to capture changes in the patterns of
growth related to different phases in the international economy give different
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TABLE 1
UNIT ROOT TESTS OF THE VARIABLES OF EQUATION [8]
GDP per capita levels in Argentina (log)
ADF Test Statistic –2.52458 1%   Critical Value* –4.2165
5%   Critical Value –3.5312
10% Critical Value –3.1968
includes trend, intercept and one lag
GDP per capita in Argentina, first difference
ADF Test Statistic –3.2618 1%   Critical Value* –3.6171
5%   Critical Value –2.9422
10% Critical Value –2.6092
includes intercept and two lags
GDP per capita levels in Brazil (log)
ADF Test Statistic –2.91857 1%   Critical Value* –4.2165
5%   Critical Value –3.5312
10% Critical Value –3.1968
includes intercept, trend and one lag
GDP per capita in Brazil, first difference
ADF Test Statistic –3.77373 1%   Critical Value* –3.6228
5%   Critical Value –2.9446
10% Critical Value –2.6105
includes intecept and two lags
GDP per capita levels in Uruguay (log)
ADF Test Statistic –3.08711 1%   Critical Value* –4.2165
5%   Critical Value –3.5312
10% Critical Value –3.1968
includes intercept, trend and one lag
GDP per capita in Uruguay, first differences
ADF Test Statistic –4.74741 1%   Critical Value* –3.6228
5%   Critical Value –2.9446
10% Critical Value –2.6105
includes intercept and two lags
GDP main markets, Argentina (levels in log)
ADF Test Statistic –3.60837 1%   Critical Value* –4.2242
5%   Critical Value –3.5348
10% Critical Value –3.1988
includes intercept, trend and two lags
GDP main markets, Argentina (first difference)
ADF Test Statistic –3.60792 1%   Critical Value* –3.6228
5%   Critical Value –2.9446
10% Critical Value –2.6105
includes intercept and two lags
GDP main markets, Brazil (levels in log)
ADF Test Statistic –3.24384 1%   Critical Value* –4.2242
5%   Critical Value –3.5348
10% Critical Value –3.1988
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TABLE 1 (Cont.)
includes intercept, trend and two lags
GDP main markets, Brazil (first difference)
ADF Test Statistic –3.1405 1%   Critical Value* –3.6228
5%   Critical Value –2.9446
10% Critical Value –2.6105
includes intecept and two lags
GDP main markets, Uruguay (levels in log)
ADF Test Statistic –2.83327 1%   Critical Value* –4.2165
5%   Critical Value –3.5312
10% Critical Value –3.1968
includes intercept, trend and intercepts
GDP main markets, Uruguay (first difference)
ADF Test Statistic –3.00286 1%   Critical Value* –3.6228
5%   Critical Value –2.9446
10% Critical Value –2.6105
includes intercept and two lags
Terms of trade levels, Argentina (in logs)
ADF Test Statistic –0.45427 1%   Critical Value* –3.6171
5%   Critical Value –2.9422
10% Critical Value –2.6092
includes intercept and two lags
Terms of trade, Argentina (first difference)
ADF Test Statistic –3.48036 1%   Critical Value* –3.6228
5%   Critical Value –2.9446
10% Critical Value –2.6105
includes intercept and two lags
Terms of trade levels, Brazil (in logs)
ADF Test Statistic –1.82598 1%   Critical Value* –3.6171
5%   Critical Value –2.9422
10% Critical Value –2.6092
intercept and two lags
Terms of trade, Brazil (first difference)
ADF Test Statistic –3.13148 1%   Critical Value* –3.6228
5%   Critical Value –2.9446
10% Critical Value –2.6105
includes intercept and two lags
Terms of trade levels, Uruguay (in logs)
ADF Test Statistic –2.66834 1%   Critical Value* –3.6171
5%   Critical Value –2.9422
10% Critical Value –2.6092
includes intercept and two lags
Terms of trade, Uruguay (first difference)
ADF Test Statistic –4.40928 1%   Critical Value* –3.6228
5%   Critical Value –2.9446
10% Critical Value –2.6105
includes intercept and two lags
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results for Argentina and Uruguay compared to Brazil. The dummy which repre-
sents the effect of the end of the classical liberal era (D30) was negative and sig-
nificant in Argentina and Uruguay, but insignificant in Brazil. The change in the
intercept with respect to the first two decades of the century is negative in all
cases, but in Argentina and Uruguay it is almost double (in absolute value) the
Brazilian figure.
iv) Inversely, the dummy which represents the influence of the Bretton
Woods system after World War II was positive and significant in the case of Brazil
but insignificant in Argentina and Uruguay. This strengthens the idea that Brazil
was better able to reshape its pattern of growth after 1946 in such a way that it
took more advantage than its neighbors of a rapidly expanding international eco-
nomy.
In the next sections we will discuss why Argentina and Uruguay suffered most
from the fall of the classical liberal era in the 1930s and why these countries fai-
led to promote structural change in order to achieve dynamic integration in the
post-Second World War years.
Notes: These coefficients were obtained by running equation [8] using an unbalanced panel data for the
period 1900-1980, including Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Coefficients are common for all countries but
external shocks are allowed to have country-specific effects.  The dependent variable is the rate of growth of
GDP per capita. The panel data is unbalanced because there are no data for Uruguayan terms of trade befo-
re 1935. Number of observations: 205. A GLS procedure was used to correct for heteroscedasticy.
Key to the variables: DLW = rate of growth of the external market of each country; DLTT =  rate of
growth of the terms of trade; D30 = country-specific dummy which adopts the value 1 for years after 1930
and zero otherwise; DWAR = country-specific dummy which adopts the value 1 for years after 1946 and zero
otherwise. A = Argentina, B = Brazil, U= Uruguay. 
TABLE 2
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS CONSTRAINED GROWTH 
AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
Variable Coefficient
C............................................................................................ 0.038***
DLW...................................................................................... 0.156**
DLTT..................................................................................... –0.014
A--D30A ............................................................................... –0.024*
B--D30B................................................................................ –0.015
U--D30U ............................................................................... –0.030**
A--DWAR2 ........................................................................... 0.015
B--DWAR2............................................................................ 0.040***
U--DWAR2 ........................................................................... 0.010
R2.......................................................................................... 0.20***
Adj R2................................................................................... 0.17
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3 Abreu (1984), pp. 144-62; Gravil, and Rooth, (1978), pp. 337-378.
4 The UK promised to consult Argentina if it became necessary to apply further restrictions on
imports from this country. UK restrictions on imports of chilled beef from Argentina should not
exceed 10% of the imports of the period June 1931-July 1932. For frozen meat and mutton, pro-
gressive restrictions would be imposed, from 10% to 35%. In turn, Argentina was expected to apply
sterling earnings buying British goods and paying dividends and interests to British capital in the
country - after the deduction of debt charges owed to other governments. Further concessions to the
UK were granted when the Treaty was renewed in 1936. Uruguay, in turn, negotiated an extension
of this agreement to protect its own market share for beef in the UK.
5 The Roca-Runciman Agreement aroused strong criticism in Argentina. It was considered that
too many concessions had been given to the UK in order to defend a group of exporters (basically,
the exporters of chilled beef) which in practice accounted for a relatively small part of Argentine
total exports. Some authors have pointed out that the Agreement was the price the government had
to pay to preserve the so-called «concordancia», the political coalition which backed the conserva-
tive governments of the 1930s. Cf. J. Fodor, and A. O’Connell, (1973), pp. 3-65. Alhadeff (1985,
pp. 367-93) has argued that the Agreement was instrumental to economic recovery after 1933 as the
Roca Funding Loan made it possible to finance a price support program for the agricultural sector.
5. CHANGING PATTERNS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
THE FALL OF THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL ERA
The origins of the demand shock suffered by Argentina and Uruguay were
related to their specialization in beef and temperate agricultural goods and with
their close connection to the UK market. This connection was virtuous while the
UK was the leading trade and financial centre, as well as the largest source of
foreign investment to the region. In addition, the expansion of railways and tech-
nological change in the agricultural and industrial sectors (especially the produc-
tion of chilled beef) implied that supply did not fall short of demand (Adelman,
1991; Lewis, 1998; Thorp, 1998). However, the dynamic stimulus resulting from
the British market shrank after World War I and especially in the 1930s when the
UK began to impose trade restrictions after the 1930 crisis 3.
In May 1933 Argentina signed the Roca-Runciman Agreement to protect its
share of the British market then threatened by the preferences granted to the
British Dominions by the Ottawa Treaty of 1932. Argentina agreed to give prefe-
rence to UK exports and investments in exchange for an import quota for
Argentine meat and other tariff concessions 4. However, the terms of the agree-
ment meant only partial relief for Argentine difficulties 5. Argentina’s position in
international trade had become remarkably weak as no country could take the
place of the UK in its foreign trade. Exports to the UK represented more than one
third of total Argentine exports in 1934-1939, while the USA, on the other hand,
absorbed less than 10%.
Moreover, Argentina’s trade balance with the USA was chronically unbalan-
ced. This would represent a key problem for Argentine trade when European
currencies in general, and sterling in particular, became inconvertible and hence a
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6 President Cantilo severely condemned US protectionism as the USA only offered to reduce
tariffs on meat and linseed up to a restricted quota (Porcile, 1995).
7 Cf. FO 371 2416, 22 January 1940.
8 Cf. Armour to the Secretary of State, 611.531/1538 in US State Department (1961), pp. 462-
463.
triangular scheme was no longer possible. Between 1918 and 1940 Argentina
obtained a surplus with the USA in only three years: 1935, 1936 and 1937. This
changed during the Second World War, but the dollar shortage was again severely
felt in the post-war years.
The competitive nature of agricultural production was a stumbling block in
trade negotiations between Argentina and the USA. The proximity of war led the
USA to seek a trade agreement with Argentina between June 1939 and January
1940 but no significant progress was made subsequently. This failure was strongly
resented by the Argentines 6. The British, whose bilateral practices were usually
criticized by the USA, observed that «negotiations [...] broke down because
America was prepared to give away very little and wanted too much. Despite these
lofty ideals about unhampered development of world trade they insisted upon a
system of quotas with a corresponding obligation of Argentina to buy American
goods» 7. Reporting on a conversation with the Argentine Economic Minister
Federico Pinedo, US Ambassador Armour suggested that the main challenge in
Argentina-USA relations was to open the US market to Argentine products. He
pointed out that «what Argentina needs is a minimum of economic security and
an opportunity to sell more in the Western hemisphere.[...] The greater problem
that will have to be faced eventually is the question of markets for wheat, meat
and other products that the USA cannot absorb» 8.
Bilateral trade problems were compounded by diplomatic conflict during
World War II when Argentina refused to declare war on the Axis powers. This
brought about an economic boycott on Argentine exports that would be extended
after the end of the war. Only in the early 1950s did bilateral Argentine-US diplo-
matic relations begin to return to normal.
The situation of Brazil in the international system was more comfortable than
that of Argentina (Malan, 1984). Firstly, the US market had absorbed about 40%
of Brazilian exports (USA was the main market for Brazilian coffee) and supplied
more than 40% of Brazilian imports since the late 1930s. Secondly, Brazil could
exert strong market power on the coffee market in which it was a leading world
exporter. In addition, the USA adopted a more flexible approach towards Brazil in
the 1930s than that adopted by the British towards Argentina. In particular, as
observed by Abreu (1984), the USA followed a multilateralist policy which relie-
ved Brazil from having to offer preferential concessions. As a British official at
the Bank of England put it: «In Brazil, [US officials argued that] their position was
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9 Cf. FO 371 2416, 22 January 1940. As mentioned, the «enlightened hegemonic» view of US
policy towards Brazil cannot be extrapolated to the case of Argentina. The USA did not liberalize
imports of agricultural products which could have harmed producers in the USA. This should be
kept in mind not only to understand tension in the US-Argentina-UK triangle, but also to unders-
tand tension in the Bretton Woods trade system, especially regarding agricultural goods and texti-
les.
as dominating as ours in Argentina and they were pleased to point out that they
had deliberately refrained from canalising trade and payments there as, they
claim, we have done in Argentina» 9. The US «multilateralist» approach towards
Brazil persisted despite the fact that Brazil traded with Germany on a bilateral
basis. The June 1936 bilateral treaty for compensated trade with Germany opened
a market for Brazil’s cotton exports —which the USA could not absorb— and
diversified Brazil’s sources of industrial goods and military equipment.
These factors explain why Argentina and Uruguay suffered a major negative
shock which significantly reduced their equilibrium growth rate, while for Brazil
the shock was milder. These facts contradict what could have been expected, given
the much better performance of the UK economy in the 1930s in comparison with
the USA. However, what seemed to be important were not just relative growth rates
in the US and the UK, but the specific dynamics of each market, in which other
variables, such as foreign policy arrangements and competitive forces, especially
the monopoly power that Brazil held in the market for coffee, played a significant
role. It should also be borne in mind that this was a long term shock, not a transi-
tory fluctuation. Markets remained closed for temperate agricultural goods after
World War II (Warley, 1976). The common agricultural policy of the European
Economic Community, agricultural protectionism in the USA, subsidised agricul-
tural exports and, in general, the fact that agriculture was excluded from the GATT
system of trade liberalisation, implied that developing countries specialising in
temperate agricultural exports suffered most from protectionism in the developed
world (Tussie, 1987). The handmaiden of growth was not in the pampas any more.
In order to achieve convergence the Southern countries had to change the basis of
their international competitiveness. However, as will be argued in the next section,
in general they failed to foster structural change in the post-war period.
6. INDUSTRIAL AND EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION AFTER
WORLD WAR II
6.1 The co-evolution of structural change and per capita GDP convergence
Since patterns of trade change through time, convergence will depend on the
ability of laggard countries to promote structural change so as to adjust to long run
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10 This is similar to the index suggested by Krugman (1991). The reference countries were
chosen as two mature economies which at the same time display important structural differences.
trends in international demand. Structural divergence and GDP convergence may
occur together if international trade develops on an inter-industry basis, as in the
classical liberal era in which Argentina and Uruguay achieved rapid growth.
However, the advantages of classical specialization dwindled after World War I
and the Great Depression. In the «Golden Era» of the post World War II period,
trade relied on manufactures and, to a significant extent, on intra-industry specia-
lisation. For a country to find a niche in international trade a certain degree of
structural convergence was required. The mechanisms of convergence changed
and industrial learning became a necessary condition for per capita GDP cat-
ching-up.
The 1960s were years in which technological catching up and the rapid expan-
sion of international trade offered significant opportunities for growth. In this
period many regions closed the technological gap with the USA, Europe and
Japan being the most successful cases (Gilpin, 1987). On the other hand, many
developed countries faced economic recession and lower productivity growth in
the 1970s which may have reduced the potential technological spillover to the rest
of the world. Still, it should be observed that the Latin American countries remai-
ned far from the technological frontier during the whole period. In this sense the
opportunities for catching up were not erased by a slower pace of technological
change in the industrialized world. As in the 1960s, there was a potential for tech-
nological and industrial upgrading which the laggard countries could exploit (or
fail to exploit) depending on the type of economic policy adopted.
There is no comparable long term time series for the economic structure of
ABU. For this reason, only evidence on structural change for 1963-1980 will be
produced. As mentioned above, for this period it is argued that structural conver-
gence was a necessary condition for per capita GDP convergence with developed
economies to be achieved. There should be a positive association between GDP
per capita convergence (divergence) and convergence (divergence) in the indus-
trial structure.
A Cross-Country Structural Change Index (CCSC) was computed in order to
obtain a proxy for structural convergence. Each ABU country was compared with
each G-4 country, namely France, Germany, the UK and the USA 10.
CCSC  ∑ k (ski-skj ).(1/2)
where ski and skj are the percentage participation of the industrial sector k in the
total value added of countries i and j, respectively. Country i is one of the ABU
countries, and country j is one of the G-4 (France, Germany, the UK or the USA).
LUIS BÉRTOLA - GABRIEL PORCILE
18
The data are drawn from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database which pre-
sents information on the structure of the manufacturing sector at a three-digit
level. As a result, there are 24 observations corresponding to the bilateral CCSC
GRAPHIC 3
CROSS-COUNTRY STRUCTURAL CHANGE INDEX (CCSC), 1963-1980
Note: Structural convergence is given by the cross-country structural change index, CCSC = ∑ k (|ski -
skj|).(1/2), where ski and skj are the percentage participation of the industrial sector k in the total value added
of countries i and j, respectively, i represents Argentina, Brazil or Uruguay and j represents France, Germany,
the United Kingdom and the United States.
Sources: Own estimates based on UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database.
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index of the three Latin America countries with each of the four developed coun-
tries (3×412 observations per period) and 2 periods (1963-1973 and 1973-
1980).
The CCSC index increases when differences in the industrial structures incre-
ase. In order to obtain a measure of the intensity of structural convergence the rate
of growth of the CCSC index is taken with the opposite sign. Thus, a positive rate
of structural convergence means that the CCSC index is falling. Figures 3a, 3b,
and 3c plot structural convergence against income convergence in 1963-1973 and
1973-1980 for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay with respect to each of the G-4
countries. As expected, the graphs indicate a positive association between struc-
tural convergence and per capita GDP convergence (change in the relative per
capita GDP).
Notes: Independent variable: Rate of convergence in GDP per capita defined as: log (GDP per capita
i/ GDP per capita j) t -  log (GDP per capita i / GDP per capita j) t – 1
Structural convergence defined as:  –(CCSC index t – CCSC index t-1)
Balanced Panel, 24 observations. Sources: see graphs 31-3c.
i = Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay; j = France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States.
A=Argentina, B=Brazil, U = Uruguay, F = France, G = Germany, UK = United Kingdom, US = United
States. 
Cross section units defined by pairs of countries.
TABLE 3
INCOME CONVERGENCE AND STRUCTURAL CONVERGENCE: 
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, URUGUAY AND THE G-4
Variable Coefficient
Structural Convergence......................................................... 0.13***
Fixed Effects
AF—C................................................................................... –0.72
AG—C .................................................................................. –0.53
AUK—C ............................................................................... –0.04
AUS—C ................................................................................ –0.09
BF—C................................................................................... 0.10
BG—C .................................................................................. 0.30
BUK—C ............................................................................... 0.67
BUS—C ................................................................................ 0.25
UF—C................................................................................... –0.52
UG—C .................................................................................. –0.39
UUK—C ............................................................................... –0.02
UUSA—C............................................................................. 0.03
Weighted Statistics
R-squared .............................................................................. 0.92***
Adjusted R-squared............................................................... 0.83
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To complement the graphical analysis, income convergence was regressed on
structural convergence on the basis of the data presented in Figures 3a-3c. Such a
regression is only indicative since the number of observations available is very
small. Using GLS panel data estimation with fixed effects it was found that per
capita GDP convergence increased by about 0.12% when structural convergence
increased by 1%. The association between the two variables was highly significant.
GRAPHIC 4
STRUCTURAL CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE WITH THE USA:
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND URUGUAY
Sources: Own estimates based on UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database.
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Figure 4 shows the evolution of the CCSCI with respect to the USA from
1963. Brazil converged with the USA while Argentina experienced almost no
change and Uruguay diverged, especially at the end of the period. Brazil was the
country with the lowest values of the CCSC index by the mid-1960s and confir-
med this position throughout the 1970s.
The results suggest that structural convergence and per capita GDP conver-
gence were related in the post-war period. Policies aimed at structural change in
favour of sectors with higher rates of demand and productivity growth may have
been important for post-war convergence. To the extent that they helped to over-
come lock-in effects and generated externality effects related to technical com-
plementarities between industries, they played a role in the selection of a more
efficient equilibrium growth path. This is the next topic to be addressed.
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11 For a comparison of the institutional and political environment in Argentina and Brazil in
this period see Sikkink (1991).
12 The implementation of the Targets Plan was under the control of the so-called «Executive
Groups», ad hoc bodies which managed policies for specific sectors such as automobiles, agricul-
tural machinery, naval construction, heavy machinery, transport and railways. These Executive Groups
operated with considerable autonomy and were quite effective in overcoming bureaucratic resistance
as they were formed by representatives from the various governmental agencies. An especially impor-
tant role was played by the GEIA (Executive Group of the Automobile Industry), which offered sig-
nificant benefits —exchange rate and tariff exemptions for imports of inputs and machinery, tax
rebates and subsidized official credits by the Bank of Brazil and the National Development Bank—
in exchange for a certain level of «nationalization» in car production. The National Development
Bank (BNDES), in turn, played a key role in the coordination of investments by the public and pri-
vate sectors (Leopoldi, 1991).
13 The classical work on the political conditions of the Targets Plan is Benevides (1976).
6.2. Industrial policy in ABU
Structural change responds to the set of incentives in place for private and
public investment. Economic policy in general, and industrial policy in particular,
help to shape these incentives. The ability of each country to implement policies
successfully and build institutions conducive to international competitiveness is
crucial for convergence (Evans, 1992; Haggard, 1990; Nelson, 1994; Reinert,
1994). It will be argued that industrial policy in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay
can explain many of the differences between these countries in terms of structural
change and convergence. More specifically, Brazil pursued a more consistent,
continuous and comprehensive policy in favour of industrial and export diversifi-
cation than Argentina and Uruguay.
The late 1950s witnessed the implantation of new capital-intensive industries
in Argentina and Brazil, led by the metal-mechanical (especially automobiles) and
the chemical industries (the so-called second phase of import-substitution, ISI-2).
The direction of structural change was similar in both countries, but the intensity
of the process was different 11.
In Brazil, industrial development took place within the framework of
Kubitschek’s Plano de Metas (Targets Plan) which provided consistent support for
industrial development, including subsidies and closed markets for new industries
for five years 12. The domestic political environment was always favourable to the
«developmentalist» project which was pushed forward even when mounting dise-
quilibria on both domestic and external fronts became evident. There was a broad
consensus in Brazil regarding the need for rapid industrial growth which sustai-
ned the «developmentalist» coalition despite macroeconomic disequilibrium 13.
Moreover, the policies applied by the military governments which ruled Brazil
after 1964 did not substantially change the industrialist drive of the previous
governments (Malan, 1984). Conversely, in Argentina ISI-2 was conflictive and
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14 On one hand, the Peronist unions looked suspiciously at Frondizi’s policies, which relied
heavily on foreign investment, especially in the oil sector, where the President openly broke his pre-
vious electoral promises of keeping this sector under exclusive state control. On the other hand,
groups in favor of more orthodox policies were alienated by the strong industrialist drive adopted
by Frondizi. Cf. Potash (1980).
15 A qualitative variable whose importance for industrial policy in subsequent years is difficult
to assess had to do with the collective perception held in each country regarding the worth and sig-
nificance of the policies of the late1950s. While in Brazil the Kubitschek period is seen with pride,
as a phase of «heroic» industrialization and stable democracy, in Argentina assessment of the Fron-
dizi period is largely dominated by controversy and criticism. See Sikkink (1991).
16 Brazil cannot be considered a successful case when compared to the South East Asian deve-
loping countries, such as Taiwan and Korea. This comparison will not be pursued here as there are
already detailed studies available in the literature (see for instance Amsden, 1985, Haggard, 1990,
and Rodrik, 1993).
traumatic, haunted by political instability. President Frondizi himself believed that
he had at most a couple of years to advance his industrial projects without cour-
ting political unrest (Szusterman, 1993). By mid-1959 the Frondizi administration
had already been checked by domestic political opposition 14. He then adopted a
severe stabilisation plan which led to a sharp contraction of the economy and hal-
ted the «developmentalist» project (Petrecolla, 1989). Two years later, Frondizi
was ousted by a military coup amidst growing political conflict and economic
downfall.
These differences in the institutional environment in which ISI-2 took place in
Argentina and Brazil were not without consequences. Their effects were clearly
reflected in the average rate of investment in 1956-61, significantly higher in
Brazil than in Argentina 15.
As already mentioned, it is not being suggested that the industrial policy then
adopted by Brazil was «ideal» in any sense. Other policy alternatives could have
avoided such high levels of protection and macroeconomic instability 16. However,
given the policy strategy that both countries adopted (namely, import-substituting
industrialization), it is clear that Brazil pursued this objective in a more consistent
manner and this had an impact on the relative success of the strategy in each
country. Moreover, Argentina and Brazil did not merely seek to substitute imports,
they also encouraged export diversification. Yet Brazilian policies in favour of
manufacturing exports continued during the 1970s while in the Argentine case
they were confined to the 1960s.
The case of Uruguay was different from those of its two bigger neighbours.
Clearly, in this case, there was no place for industrial policies of the kind adopted
in Brazil and Argentina. Uruguay’s narrow domestic market did not allow for a
strategy of advancing import-substituting industrialization. The advance of ISI
would have implied a much higher cost in terms of inefficiency than in Argentina
and Brazil. Therefore, the only avenue open to Uruguay was to diversify exports
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17 The USA argued that the system of multiple exchange rates represented an implicit subsidy
for wool exports. For an account of the policy dilemmas of the period and the difficulties of expor-
ting to the closed US markets, see Batlle (1965).
18 Cf. Barros de Castro, and Souza (1985), Suzigan, and Villela (1997), and Suzigan (2000).
in order to enter more dynamic international markets in sectors with higher value
added. In the 1940s and 1950s Uruguay’s export structure was reoriented towards
wool products and some agricultural products exported to the dollar area. A
system of multiple exchange rates was adopted in order to encourage the indus-
trialisation of primary goods including wool. The government of Luis Batlle, in
the first half of the 1950s, was also concerned with promoting diversification in
the agricultural sector, offering subsidies and loans for the production of wheat,
milk and vegetables. However, this strategy was challenged by the persistence of
protectionist barriers on temperate agricultural goods in the USA and Europe and
by the US tax applied on Uruguayan exports of wool products 17. Thus, Uruguay’s
competitive advantage remained in sectors facing increasing barriers in the inter-
national economy which reduced the income elasticity of its exports. Moreover,
domestic policies did not help. The overvaluation of the exchange rate and high
levels of industrial protection during the Neo-Batllista period held back the
growth of exports (Bértola, 1991). Only in the mid 1970s would Uruguay imple-
ment a new and more successful drive towards export diversification which posi-
tively affected growth rates (Bértola and Porcile, 1998).
Brazil proved more able to move towards a diversified economic structure, but
some other features of the Brazilian economy may help to explain why it achie-
ved higher rates of growth. Brazil is a populous country whose foreign sector
represents a smaller share of total demand. Since income levels were lower, inco-
me growth increased the demand for basic consumption goods which can be pro-
duced with mature technologies. Moreover, rather low real wages made produc-
tion based on mature technologies internationally competitive in terms of unit
labour costs. Even durables and consumption goods aimed at high income groups
were able to reach a relatively large scale of production in Brazil due to the size
of the domestic market, in spite of the highly unequal pattern of income distribu-
tion.
Divergence in industrial policy between Argentina and Brazil became espe-
cially significant in the second half of the 1970s. While in the 1950s Argentina and
Brazil moved in the same direction (albeit with a different degree of success), in
the second half of the 1970s they moved in completely opposing directions.
In 1974 Brazil adopted an especially ambitious program of industrial deve-
lopment, the PND-II (Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento), aimed at implanting
a new set of capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries, mainly in the
intermediate and capital goods sectors 18. This move was prompted by the 1973 oil
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19 In addition, Brazil strengthened its diplomatic and economic links with Europe, especially
with Germany, in order to set up nuclear projects.
20 See Katz, and Kosacoff (1989), and Kosacoff (1992).
crisis and sought to «complete» the industrial matrix through a new wave of
import-substituting industrialisation. In addition, Brazil made an effort to further
diversify its export structure by increasing manufactured exports, especially to
other developing countries. As a result, the import coefficient of the economy was
further reduced while the export coefficient increased. In order to achieve this
objective, a comprehensive array of policy measures was adopted, including
financial subsidies for the new industries, stricter import restrictions (based lar-
gely on non-tariff barriers managed by the Foreign Trade Bureau, Portuguese
acronym CACEX) and subsidies to manufactured exports, combined with active
diplomacy towards developing countries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin
America 19. The abundance of foreign capital was instrumental in broadening the
degree of autonomy needed by Brazil to finance this new wave of industrializa-
tion. This new industrialisation effort in Brazil succeeded in promoting the con-
vergence of its industrial structure with that of the industrialised countries.
Like Brazil, Argentina used the relative abundance of foreign loans to set up
an ambitious program for industrial restructuring but these programs moved in
opposing directions. Argentina sought to regain competitiveness by dismantling
its system of industrial protection and by increasing exports based on static com-
parative advantages 20. In addition, the exchange rate was managed in accordance
with the so-called «monetary approach to the balance of payments» with deva-
luation occurring at a pre-announced declining rate. This led to a combination of
overvaluation of the real exchange rate with rapid trade openness which severely
affected the competitive capacity of Argentine industry (Kosacoff and
Beszinchsky, 1993).
The Argentine liberal experience led to deep recession. Moreover, the drastic
contraction of the metal-mechanical industries halted the previous process of slow
cumulative industrial learning. Except for a few cases (involving industries which
were both energy-intensive and natural resource-intensive) no industry received
special support as the policy was explicitly aimed at providing a neutral environ-
ment from the point of view of the allocation of factors of production (Aspiazu,
1989). Yet no new export-oriented sector appeared to play the leading role in eco-
nomic growth previously played by the import-substituting industries.
The contrasting experiences in industrial transformation of Argentina and
Brazil ended with the 1982 debt crisis. Both countries had followed policies
which, for different reasons, threatened competitiveness and external equilibrium.
In the case of Brazil, the array of subsidies provided by the PND-II represented a
source of tension as the government faced a growing fiscal deficit. The fall in the
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import coefficient burdened industrial efficiency and specialisation (Bonelli et al.,
1992). In the case of Argentina, the reversal of structural change towards agricul-
tural and industrial commodities inhibited industrial learning and the possibility
of entering more dynamic international markets. Moreover, both policies were
sustained on the basis of a growing external debt. The drastic increase of interest
rates in 1979 and the subsequent 1982 Mexican default triggered the debt crisis
which put an end to the policies of the 1970s and opened up «the lost decade».
Argentina and Brazil converged towards a turbulent period of economic decline.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Convergence and divergence in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay (ABU) occu-
rred in different historical scenarios defined by different combinations of techno-
logical diffusion, openness, specialisation and institutional arrangements at
domestic and international levels. Three different regimes of convergence can be
identified.
The first convergence regime is associated with a dynamic integration into the
golden era of classic liberalism. Convergence occurred on the basis of inter-
industry specialization in primary goods with high income elasticity of demand.
The international context was characterised by openness and growing demand.
Competitive advantages were classical, related to the relative abundance of factors
of production. This was the case of Argentina and Uruguay in 1870-1913, efficient
producers of meat and temperate agricultural goods. Not only did Argentina con-
verge in this period but it also forged ahead in relation to the European countries,
following a path which, in its early phases, resembled (with less intensity) the suc-
cessful experience of the United States.
The second convergence regime corresponds to a period during which inter-
national trade collapsed because of major international crises (the Great
Depression, World Wars I and II) but the countries were able to grow thanks to
import-substitution. In effect, modest convergence was achieved by Brazil in the
1930s by means of import-substituting industrialization and Uruguay achieved a
short period of convergence on this basis after World War II. However, this regi-
me of convergence was inevitably short-lived as the international economy reco-
vered and import-substitution imposed increasingly higher costs. A change in the
pattern of trade was therefore necessary to sustain convergence.
The third convergence regime is defined by structural convergence with the
leaders, based on a process of catching-up in new metal-mechanical and chemical
industries implanted in the late 1950s. The only ABU country to display such a
pattern of convergence is Brazil. Structural transformation in the «developmenta-
list» period changed the growth trends of Argentina and Brazil irreversibly and
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gave rise to incremental, cumulative industrial learning. Although the domestic
market remained as the principal outlet for industrial production, a slow but con-
tinuous process of export diversification occurred, especially in Brazil. This regi-
me emerged in a period in which international trade grew at very high rates (1960-
1973) or in which international capital flows expanded, compensating for the loss
of dynamism of international trade (1973-1978).
A critical question is why Argentina and Uruguay were not able to move from
the first type of convergence regime to the second. Clearly, path-dependency phe-
nomena were important. Not only specific physical capital but also expectations
about the composition of growth are part of the «shadow of the past» constraining
investment decisions. However, cumulative processes can be slowed down and
sometimes reversed with the introduction of policies favouring structural change
which may help the country to escape from the endogenous cycle of economic
decay. Brazil adopted policies for structural change in a much more vigorous way
than Argentina and Uruguay and this is part of the explanation for the relative suc-
cess of Brazil until 1980. On the other hand, the experience of the decades follo-
wing the debt crisis suggest that, in all cases, policies aimed at structural change
in the region were too weak to secure long run catching-up.
This paper combined supply-side and demand-side variables to explain why
three Latin America countries failed to achieve convergence with the developed
world in the 20th century. Demand-side variables were related to changes in pat-
terns of demand and to institutional arrangements in the international economy
which brought an end to the classical liberal era of British hegemony, redefining
the rules of the game in international trade. Supply-side variables were related to
path-dependency and the failure of the Latin American countries (particularly
Argentina and Uruguay, and to a lesser extent Brazil) to build up an institutional
framework conducive to rapid structural change and rapidly growing exports of
manufactures. Although it is argued that these variables are helpful for understan-
ding differences in the growth performance of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay bet-
ween 1900 and 1980, they should be seen as a first step in a cumulative research
agenda on long run growth in Latin America. Some key dimensions of the deter-
minants of growth were not included in this paper and should be addressed in the
future. The evolution of the terms of trade, the influence of income distribution on
demand growth and human capital accumulation and the impact on the external
constraint of foreign capital flows (either in the form of foreign direct investment
or that of short term capital movements) are just some of these dimensions. They
would enrich the characterization of the different convergence and divergence
regimes to be found in Latin American economic history.
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